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RECENT CASES
HOMlICIDE-TRIAL-INSTRUCTIONS--VERSOLE V. COMMONWEALTH, 163
S. W., 496.-In the prosecution of a wife for the killing of her husband,
it was held, that it was error to refuse an instruction that if the husband
ordered her to leave the house, and threatened to kill her if she didn't, and
on her refusal assaulted her-the wife had a right to use all necessary
force to resist, even to the point of killing the husband.
To justify a killing on the ground of self-defense the defendant must
have had ground to believe himself in great peril, that the killing was
necessary for escape, and there were no other safe means of retreat.
People v. Mallon, 116 N. Y. App., 425. But in some of the southern states
the doctrine prevails that a man need not retreat if he is where he has a
right to be, even though the retreat could be safely made. Brinkley v. State,
89 Ala., 34. But to the- general rule as to the necessity of retreat there is
an universal exception that one attacked in his own house, and who is in
the right, need not retreat but may resist even to the point of killing his
assailant. State v. Bissonnette, 83 Ct., 261; Andrews v. State, 159 Ala., 115;
Jones v. State, 76 Ala., 8. But the defendant must himself have been with-
out fault. State v. Touri 101 Minn., 370. The theory is that when a man
is in his own house he is deemed to have retreated to the wall and need
not retreat further. Palmer v. State, 9 Wyo., 40. A man being in his own house
need not fly as far as he can, as in other cases of se defendendo, for he hath
the protection of his house to excuse him from flying. 1 Hale, P. C., 486.
In the case of the husband and wife, the husband's home is the wife's
home and she needn't retreat therefrom to avoid a difficulty even with her
husband. Hutchison v. State, 165 Ala., 16. A person in his own house has
the same right to stand his ground and kill in self defense when assaulted
by a partner or co-tenant. Jones v. State, 76 Ala., 8. The principal case is
in accord with the great weight of authority in making, under these cir-
cumstances, an exception to the rule that there is a duty to retreat.
INFANTs-CONTRACT TO PURCHASE LAND- RESCISSION.-HEALY v. KEu-
LOG, 145 N. Y. S.; 943.-An infant entered into a contract to purchase land
on installments. After reaching his majority the infant, not wishing to
perform, offered to return the contract, and demanded back the money
already paid. The defendant refused to release the infant and threatened
to send her to jail if she failed to perform. The infant thereupon made
several payments when, learning of her rights, refused to carry out the
contract. Held, notice of her disaffirmance together with her offer to re-
turn the contract amounted to a disaffirmance, though in ignorance of her
rights, and under duress, she made several payments after reaching her
majority, believing she was still bound by her contract.
In contracts relating to realty, the earlier cases held that the act of
rescission on the part of an infant must be one of the same solemnity and
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dignity as the original act. A deed of bargain and sale of waste or un-
cultivated land by an infant was avoided by a subsequent deed of bargain
and sale of the same land to a third party after majority. Jackson v. Car-
penter, 11 Johns., 541; Jackson v. Burchin, 14 Johns., 124. But if the
land was in a state of cultivation and the infant was out of possession,
the infant must enter in addition to executing a deed. Roberts v. Wiggins,
1 N. H., 73; Harris v. Cannon, 6 Ga., 382. The foregoing views do not
generally prevail in modern law. "The disaffirming act need take no par-
ticular form or expression, but it must show an unequivocal intent to re-
pudiate." Singer Mfg. Co. v. Lamb, 81 Mo., 225; Heath v. West, 26 N. H.,
199. -Contracts relating to persons or personalty may be disaffirmed by
any act which shows an intention not to be bound by them. Skinner v.
Maxwell, 66 N. C., 47. There has been no generally accepted principle laid
down by the courts governing the rescission of contracts by infants. The
tendency has been, and it now appears to be the prevailing rule, to look
at the intent of the infant and to give effect to it. This decision is clearly
sound and is in harmony with the general tendency of the courts.
MASTER AND SERVANT-VOLUNTARY AssocyATIoN-LIABILITY.-WAHL-
HEIMER V. HARDENBERGH, Apr. Div., N. Y., JAN., 1914. CLARK AND SCOTT,
JJ., dissenting.-Several newspapers formed a voluntary news association
to collect and distribute news. The association was duly organized with
the customary officers and an executive committee. Defendant was em-
ployed as general manager with authority to employ help to carry out the
purposes of the association uoder the direction of the executive commit-
tee. One of the defendant's subordinates in the course of his employment
wrote and published matter libelous per se of the plaintiff. Defendant
knew nothing of the affair till two years later, when suit was brought.to
recover damages for the libel. Held, defendant was liable on the theory
of respondeat superior.
At common law voluntary associations were regarded as partnerships
in the transaction of business. Williams v. Bank of Michigan, 7 Wend.,
542; Ferris v. Thaw, 5 Mo. App., 279. No action could be maintained
against an unincorporated .association as such; Karges Furniture Co. v.
Local Union No. 131 et al., 165 Ind., 414; but could against the members
composing the association; Bullock v. Dunning, 54 Ind., 115; and each
member who participates in tortious acts of the association will be liable.
Comm. v. Hunt, 4 Met. 111; Carew v. Rutherford, 106 Mass., .. A master
is liable for injuries to third persons caused by the act of his servant act-
ing within the scope of his employment. Toledo, W. & W. R. Co. v. Har-
won, 47 IIl., 298; Gray v. Portland Bank, 3 Mass., 363. A servant who is
sued by such third party may have an action over against his master.
Gower v. Emery, 18 Me., 79, Lowell v. Boston & Lowell R. R., 23 Picker-
ing, 24; Willard v. Newbury, 22 Vt. 458. The majority opinion proceeds
on the theory that the defendant is the master and his subordinates his
servants. The dissenting opinion takes the position that the association
is the responsible head, and the subordinates as well as the defendant are
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its employes. This position is without doubt sbund. The error into which
the majority of the court have fallen is in failing to recognize and treat
the association as a partnership composed of the several newspaper cor-
porations. If we grant the court's assumption, one that is probably incor-
rect in fact, that the association was merely a name with no actual per-
sons or corporations as members, its conclusion that the defendant was
the actual employer is no doubt accurate.
MASTER AND SERVANT-LIABILITY FOR NEGLIGENCE OF SERVANT'S AssIsT-
ANT.-DILLON V. MUNDET Er AL., 145 N. Y. S., 975.-A servant being en-
gaged in the business and on behalf of his master and acting within the
scope of his employment, the master is liable for negligence of one as-
sisting the servant therein, at the servant's request, resulting in injury to
a third person.
Haluptzok v. Great Northern Ry. 55 Minn., 446, decided that where
a servant procures another to assist him, the master is liable only if the
servant had express or implied authority; likewise 26 Cyc., 1521. Where d_!-
fendant's servant, driving former's horse, gave the reins to another, de-
fendant was held liable for a resultant injury. Booth v. Mister, 7 Carr.
& P., 66; Mangan v. Foley, 33 Mo. App., 250, held there was no liability
when defendant's teamster engaged a third person to drive temporarily.
Jewell v. Grand Trunk Railroad, 55 N. H., 84; Thorp v. Minor, 109 N. C.,
152; Appel v. Eaton & Co., 97 Mo. App., 428; accord. In these cases ab-
sence of authority to employ assistants was decisive. Simmns v. Monier,
29 Barb., 419, held the master is liable only if the servant directed the act.
This was the fact in the principal case, which might better be put on the
ground of the negligence of the servant himself, since, at the time of the
collision, he was in the automobile, and the negligence of the driver was
substantially his.
Many cases, however, lay down the rule as broadly as in Dillon v. Mun-
det; Dimmitt v. Hannibal Railroad, 40 Mo. App., 654; Lakin v. Oregon-
Pacific Railroad, 15 Ore., 220; Pittsburgh v. Detroit Transportation Com-
pany, 122 Mich., 445. On the facts the decision doubtless harmonizes
with the great majority of cases, for, though no authority was shown, the
servant so directed the act that it was his in fact.
MUNICIPAL CORPORATIONS-TORTS-REIDEg V. CITY OF MT. VERNON, 145
N. Y. S., 697.-Under an ordinance forbiding the use of fireworks in the
streets or elsewhere in the city within the fire limits, except by permission
of the mayor, it was held, that the mayor had no authority to permit the
use of fireworks in the city other than in the streets or within the fire
limits and when he did so, and the plaintiff was injured as a result, the
defendant city is not liable.
It is now well settled that a municipality may render itself liable for a
tortious act. Buttrick v. City of Lowell, 1 Allen, 172. But the city can act
only through authorized officers and it cannot be held liable unless these
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officers had authority under the premises. Rutherford v. City of William-
son, 70 W. Va., 402. So a city can only be liable for torts arising out of
changing the grade of a street where the change was not authorized by
ordinance. Gardner v. City of St. Joseph, 96 Mo. App., 657. But subse-
quent ratification by a proper body would make the city city liable. Ruth-
erford v. City, supra. The law is best summed up as follows: the cor-
poration is not liable for the unauthorized acts of its officers though done
colore offlcii; it must further appear that they were expressly authorized
to so the acts, or that they were done bona fide in pursuance of a general
authority to act for the city on the subject to which they relate. thayer
et al. v. City of Boston, 19 Pick., 511. And whether a power has been
delegated is a question for the jury. Thayer et al. v. City of Boston, supra.
In the principal case the limitations on the mayor's authority were clearly
indicated and the holding is in accord with all the authorities.
NEGLIGENCE-INJURIES TO CHILD OF SERVANT-IMPUTED NEGLIGENCE.
-CLOVER CREAMERY Co. v. DIEHL, 63 So. (ALA.), 196.-tfendant main-
tained on its premises certain machinery which it negligently permitted to
be left open and unguarded, although it knew the plaintiff lived upon the
premises and was continually playing around the machinery. Plaintiff's
father was the manager in charge of defendant's plant. The plaintiff, a
three-year-old child, was injured by the machinery while being operated
by the defendant's manager. Held, the contributory negligence of the
father was not available as a defense to an action against the company for
injuries to the child.
The doctrine of imputed negligence in this class of cases arose in the
leading case of Hartfield v. Roper, 21 Wend., 615, which held that a child
of such tender years as not to possess sufficient discretion to avoid danger
who was permitted to be in a public highway without any one to guard
him and is injured by a traveller cannot recover, because of the negligence
of his parent, unless the injury was wilful. This doctrine prevails in a
few jurisdictions. Casey v. Smith, 152 Mass., 294; Leslie v. Lewiston, 62
Me., 468; Hathway v. T. W. & W. R. Co., 46 Ind., 25. The contrary doc-
trine, the one prevailing in the majority of states, was laid down in the
leading case of Robinson v. Stone, 22 Vt., 213. Other states in accord are
Daley v. N. & W. R. Co., 26 Conn., 598; Bisaillau v. Blood, 64 N. H., 565.
See 21 L. R. A, 77, note, for authorities pro and con. Some courts hold
that the parent's contributory negligence bars a recovery by the child when
the parent is present and the child is in his custody. Ohio & M. R. Co. v.
Stratton, 78 Ill., 88. There is a good deal of authority contra. Wymore
v. Makasha County, 6 L. R. A. (Iowa), 545, and note. By the great weight
of authority the negligence of a parent cannot be imputed to 'the child.
Cleveland Roll. Mill Co. v. Corrigan, 46 Ohio St., 283; Chicago City R. Co.
v. Wilcox, 8 L. R. A. (Ill.), 494. The sounder view is doubtless the one
laid down in the principal case, the theory being that the public owes duties
to the child as well as to the parent, one of which is to prevent injuries
to the child, and when a member of the public has failed in his duty he
should be held responsible to the child, regardless of the negligence of the
parent in discharging his duty.
